• Anup Kumar Srivastava

Over the past five years, India has projected itself on the global stage as a rising power: a champion of non-alignment, strategic autonomy, and regional leadership. Yet closer inspection reveals a pattern of diplomatic missteps, incoherence, and missed opportunities. India’s foreign policy, rather than being boldly principled, has too often been reactive, ambiguous, and outpaced by rivals — notably China. Rather than delivering strength, many recent decisions have weakened India’s standing with neighbours, alienated key partners, and exposed strategic vulnerabilities.

Strategic Autonomy or Conflicted Signals?

India’s self-proclaimed policy of “strategic autonomy” is intended to preserve its freedom to choose friends without being boxed in. However, the world has begun seeing this not as strength but as inconsistency. Take India’s position on the Russia-Ukraine war: India has refused to condemn Russia outright, increased trade in Russian oil, while also engaging diplomatically with the West. This has led critics to argue that India has compromised moral standing without gaining the clear trust or partnership of Western powers (Jaishankar, 2025; Modi, 2023) (Jaishankar’s critique of Western attempts to moralize the conflict underscores this dissonance; Modi’s assertion that criticism in the U.S. is not widespread is seen by some as tone-setting rather than proof of confidence) (India rejects Western criticism, 2025; Modi interview, 2023). Furthermore, India’s participation in the Zapad-2025 war games with Russia and Belarus, despite ongoing war in Ukraine, has raised alarm among European partners, notably the EU, which sees these as provocative and problematic for the rules-based international order (India Today, 2025; EU foreign policy chief remarks) (India joins Zapad-2025, 2025; EU cautions India, 2025). These acts send conflicting messages: India wants to be part of the global order yet refuses to fully align with it when it comes to punishment of bad actors — and this ambiguity is costly both reputationally and in terms of trust among allies.

Fading Influence in South Asia: When “Neighbourhood First” Becomes “Neighbourhood Forget”

A major tragic flaw of recent Indian diplomacy is its weakening influence in its immediate neighbourhood. The long-lauded “Neighbourhood First” policy, meant to secure India’s hinterland and regional support, is increasingly seen as brittle or declining. An incisive critique comes from Bangladesh, where the change of government (post-Hasina) has shifted the foreign policy orientation away from India. As the interim government under Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus pivots toward stronger ties with China and Pakistan, India’s privileged position is eroding rapidly (Financial Times, 2025). China’s increasing investments in Bangladesh — e.g., in strategic infrastructure, the port of Mongla, Teesta River development — coupled with Bangladesh’s engagement with Pakistan and reorientation in diplomatic posture, mark a serious diplomatic loss for India in the region (FT, 2025). Analysts from Pakistan have explicitly called out the failure of India’s neighbourhood policy. In a scathing opinion piece, a scholar wrote that India’s influence in Sri Lanka, Nepal, Maldives, and even Bangladesh has suffered because India tends to prioritize its own interests over mutual respect and cooperation, often employing coercive or heavy-handed diplomatic tools (Ibnat Rifah, 2025). The essay argues that India has failed to rebuild trust in its neighbourhood; instead of being a benign leader, it is being seen increasingly as domineering. An example: recent border tensions with Bangladesh, including allegations and counter-allegations over involvement in internal unrest (e.g., in Khagrachhari district) and revocation of key transit and trans-shipment facilities, exacerbate bilateral distrust. Diplomacy that should be about building bridges has turned into accusations and cold retorts (FT, 2025; ToI, 2025).

Defence Diplomacy: Old Partnerships, New Constraints

India continues to rely heavily on Russia not only for energy but for defence cooperation and military supply. Participation in Zapad-2025 underscores this dependence: the government dispatched a contingent of the Kumaon Regiment and other forces for war games in Russia/Belarus despite ongoing global condemnation of Russian aggression (India Today, 2025). Critics argue this undermines India’s access to the West and complicates attempts to align with rules-based orders, especially when Western trade and security cooperation hinge in part on shared values. Moreover, the optics are worsening: Western nations and the EU have explicitly flagged India’s Russian associations as obstacles to deeper strategic and trade agreements. European leaders such as Kaja Kallas have said that participating in war games and continuing oil imports from Russia are “obstacles” to enhancing cooperation with India under the rubric of shared normative frameworks (ToI, 2025; Moneycontrol, 2025). In short, India’s refusal to decisively distance itself from Russia is increasingly costly as the global order polarizes.

Trade Tensions: When Diplomacy Cannot Paper Over Economic Strain

India’s foreign policy miscalculations are not limited to military or normative domains; they also have economic consequences. Recent trade friction with the United States — particularly over tariffs imposed on Indian exports (some of them justified by U.S. officials by citing India’s continued Russian oil imports) — have resulted in capital outflows, weakening of the rupee, and strains on markets (India Today, 2025; Reuters, 2025). Simultaneously, regional trade relations are suffering. Bangladesh, once a close trade partner, is showing signs of economic distancing and resentment: revocation of transit rights, restrictions, and allegations of protectionism are eroding mutual trade interdependence (Pakistan Today, 2025). Where economic diplomacy is meant to underwrite strategic influence, weak economic policy and inconsistent engagement are creating openings for rivals — chiefly China — to expand their footprint.

Moral Credibility: The Erosion of Global Standing

Diplomatic strength depends significantly on perception: is a country viewed as principled, consistent, and trustworthy? On these metrics, India has taken hits. Human rights critiques, especially concerning citizenship laws, deportations at the Bangladesh border, and internal allegations of discrimination, are increasingly used by international media to question India’s moral authority (The Guardian, 2025). When foreign policy pursues “balance” but domestic practice is perceived as compromising core democratic or legal norms, foreign partners begin to discount public statements. Similarly, India’s reluctance to take a clear stand against violations of international law — as in Ukraine — is read by many not as strategic nuance but as hedging that undermines India’s credibility among Western democracies. Even Indian commentators are now asking whether India’s foreign policy pragmatism has become cynicism (Rizvi, 2025).

Strategic Vacuum: China’s Gains and India’s Missed Windows

While India has often been reactive, China has been proactive across South Asia, making strong inroads in infrastructure, investment, and diplomatic influence. The Financial Times reports that China is pursuing a “Charm offensive” in India’s neighbours — Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka — combining trade, military cooperation, and political outreach to counterbalance India’s dominance (FT, 2025). These are not isolated observations: many South-Asian nations are recalibrating to hedge between India and China, dissatisfied with India’s mix of moral rhetoric, security posturing, and economic protectionism. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (if contested) continue to attract partner governments, especially where Indian-offered alternatives seem slow, conditional, or opaque.

The Need for Vision, Coherence, and Trust

India stands at a diplomatic crossroads. It has the material, geopolitical, and economic potential to play a defining role in Asia and the world. But as of 2025, much of that potential is unfulfilled because of foreign policy that is contradictory in words, ambiguous in action, and often insensitive in engagement with immediate neighbours and global partners.

What must change?

Clarity over ambiguity: If “strategic autonomy” is to remain the foundation, India needs clearer communication of what it means in practice so that allies are not perpetually unsure where India stands on crucial issues. Neighbourhood first — in earnest: It is no longer enough to invest in infrastructure or aid; India must repair political trust, avoid coercion, honor previous commitments, and show respect for sovereignty. Soft power must be matched with listening. Aligning credibility with conduct: Domestic human rights and legal norms cannot be treated as separate from foreign policy if India wants to be seen as leading a democratic alternative globally. Balancing values and interests: While realism matters, India must be selective: some engagements with Russia or others may serve short-term interests but harm long-term strategic goals with the West or with stability in its neighbourhood. Proactive diplomacy over reaction: Move from crisis responses to strategic long-term planning: defining red lines, negotiating frameworks, and enhancing diplomatic capacity. If India fails to address these flaws, China will continue to erode its influence in its own backyard, economic partners will trust less, and diplomatic isolation may set in — ironically, despite India’s vocal ambitions. India has built many pillars through decades of non-alignment and regional engagement; unless it fortifies them with coherence, principle, and trust, they risk collapsing under pressure.

References: 1. Financial Times. (2025, October 6). China’s charm offensive in India’s backyard. FT.com. https://www.ft.com/content/4e51a37e-c856-4a68-8ed7-9381ec788b6e 2. (as cited: India’s neighbouring states increasingly drawn toward China) (Financial Times, 2025). 3. India Today. (2025, September 17). India joins Russia and Belarus ZAPAD military drills amid trade tensions with US. India Today. https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/india-joins-russia-and-belarus-zapad-military-drills-amid-trade-rift-with-us-2788476 4. (Zapad participation causes unease in the West) (India Today, 2025). 5. The Times of India. (2025). EU cautions India on drills and oil imports. The Times of India. (EU voices concern over military exercises and oil with Russia) (ToI, 2025). 6. The Guardian. (2025, June 19). India illegally deporting Muslim citizens at gunpoint to Bangladesh, say rights groups. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2025/jun/19/india-deporting-indians-muslim-citizens-bangladesh-say-rights-groups-border 7. (human rights critique) (The Guardian, 2025). 8. Pakistan Today. (2025, March 13). Ibnat Rifah, A. (2025). Failure of India’s ‘Neighbourhood First’ Policy. Pakistan Today. (Neighbourhood policy failures) (Ibnat Rifah, 2025). 9. Modi, N. (2023, June). Share in various interviews: criticism of India’s stance on Russia not widespread in U.S. (Modi’s remarks on global perception) (Modi, 2023). 10. Jaishankar, S. (2025, May). ‘India seeks partners, not preachers’: Jaishankar criticises Western approach to Russia-Ukraine conflict. Mathrubhumi. https://english.mathrubhumi.com/news/india/s-jaishankar-india-looks-for-partners-with-mutual-interests-not-preachy-approaches-criticising-western-efforts-russia-ukraine-conflict-mu4w816r/ 11. (Jaishankar’s remark on Western criticism and India’s stance) (Jaishankar, 2025).

(The author is freelance writer and trainer, brings rich insights into the intersection of finance and economics through his research & writing with a strong background in business studies & corporate analysis.)